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2Abstract
With increasing labor and capital mobility in the world, remittance flows have risen 
significantly to become the second source after FDI of external funding for developing 
countries. Remittances are now viewed by many development practitioners as an important
development tool for recipient countries. This paper studies the impact of remittances on 
poverty in Albania – one of the top 20 remittance-receiving countries in the world. It is found 
that remittances have a significant impact on the reduction of absolute poverty in the country 
by directly raising household income and consumption. However, since emigration is costly, 
remittances do not reach the poorest individuals, which can have a negative impact on 
inequality. Moreover, there seems to be a high degree of dependency on remittances in 
Albania, both on the micro and macro level. Therefore, the sustainability of this source of 
income is of special concern.
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71.  Introduction
1.1 Background  
As globalization has eased labor and capital mobility remittance flows have increased 
immensely, to become the second source after FDI1 of external funding for developing 
countries. Remittances are defined as the portion of international migrant workers’ earnings 
sent back from the country of employment to the country of origin.2
The growing importance of remittances as a source of foreign exchange is reflected in the fact 
that remittance growth has outpaced private capital flows and ODA over the last decade3, 
going up from 31.2 billion USD in 1990 to 166.9 billion USD in 2005. This phenomenon has 
turned great attention to the causes and effects of international migration and remittances, 
both in the migrant source and destination country. Earlier literature on remittances has 
emphasized their negative impacts and cautioned against the possible damaging effects of 
labor migration and remittance sending, arguing that remittances, being compensatory, are 
mainly spent on consumer goods instead of productive investment and thus create a culture of 
dependency which undermines the prospects for development. Recently, development 
practitioners have viewed remittances as having an important role to play in the development 
efforts of recipient countries. This opens up a debate abut possible mechanisms that could be 
developed or improved to maximize the positive development impacts from remittances. Such 
policy implications are especially interesting for developing country governments.
With an annual inflow of remittances amounting to 14% of its GDP4, Albania is ranked 
among the top 20 remittance recipient countries in the world.5 From 1994 to 2002 the 
Albanian economy experienced the fastest rise in real GDP in Eastern Europe.6 During the 
same period, the country experienced a massive outflow of labor, with some 25% of the 
population living and working abroad by the end of 2005.7 At the same time, remittances 
received showed an upward trend. Studies by the World Bank, IMF and INSTAT show a 
positive relationship between remittances received from migrant workers and poverty 
                                               
1 Ratha (2003), page 20
2 Russell (1986), page 677
3 World Bank (2006), page 88
4 World Bank (2007)
5 World Bank (2006), page 90
6 Korovilas (2005) , page 176
7 Gedeshi (2006), page 113
8reduction in the country. However, the sustainability of this source of finance is put into 
question.
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of this field study and the thesis itself is to evaluate the impact of remittances on 
poverty in Albania.
The questions I will seek to answer are:
- What is the magnitude of remittances in Albania?
- How are remittances distributed across the country?
- What are remittances spent on?
- Which transfer channels are most commonly used?
- How do remittances affect: 1. Absolute poverty; 2. Relative poverty and 3. inequality
in Albania?
1.3 Data
This study is based on secondary sources, mainly from the nationally representative 
household survey – LSMS 2005- carried out by INSTAT in collaboration with the WB, as 
well as household surveys/studies undertaken by CESS, which is also the most experienced 
institute in the field in Albania. Other sources of information are the Bank of Albania, from 
where I have collected macro-economic indicators as well as figures on the magnitude of 
remittances. The description of migration patterns and characteristics are mainly based on 
data from IOM but also from previous studies on remittances’ impact on the Albanian 
economy/society. I have found no available data on poverty patterns previous to 2002. The 
most comprehensive data on poverty reduction comes from the World Bank poverty 
assessment 2002-2005, which is used as a basis when explaining poverty trends.
1.4 Disposition
This paper is disposed in the following way: The first chapter gives an introduction to the 
phenomenon of remittances and why this is relevant to Albania. In chapter two follows a brief 
review of the theoretical approaches to the causes and consequences of remittances. Some of 
9the best known empirical studies on the effect of remittances on poverty and inequality are
summarized in this chapter. Background information on migration trends and migrant profile 
in Albania is presented in chapter three. Chapter four looks at the characteristics of 
remittances in Albania and their magnitude since 1990 onwards. In chapter five poverty 
measures that will be used in the analysis are discussed, followed by a description on poverty 
patterns and poverty reduction in the country. An integrated analysis on poverty and 
remittances is carried out in chapter six. The impact of remittances on absolute and relative 
(perceived) poverty is discussed, and lastly some of the indirect effects of remittances on the 
macroeconomic level are outlined. The paper ends with a conclusion in chapter seven.
10
2.  Remittances and poverty - Theoretical considerations and 
previous studies
The theoretical and empirical literature on remittances focuses mainly on three aspects:
1. The causes of remittances (motives and determinants)
2. The use of remittances 
3. The impact of remittances on the economy
Data on remittances is mainly micro-data based on household surveys, and results of their 
effects are quite variable depending on setting, country or migrant group studied. This hinders 
general inference. Moreover, measuring remittances is a difficult task since most of the 
money remitted goes through informal channels and is not recorded in official accounts.
2.1 Motives and Determinants of Remittances
The basis for the current discussion and extensions on motives that migrants have to remit 
was set by Stark and Lucas in 1985. Drawing conclusions from studies made on a household 
level in Botswana, they suggested the main motives to be “pure altruism”, “pure self-interest” 
and “tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest”. The most common and most accepted 
motive for remitting money back home is what is known as altruism- the migrants concern 
about the well being of the family members left behind in the home country. The migrant 
cares about the financial situation of the family, receives positive utility from consumption 
and welfare of the family and consequently sends remittances. The altruistic model advances 
a number of hypotheses. First, the amount of remittances should increase with the migrant’s 
income. Second, the amount of remittances should decrease with an increase in the family 
income. And third, remittances should decrease over time as the attachment to the family 
gradually weakens.8 In contrast to altruism, pure self interest is shown to be another motive to 
remit. The migrant’s behavior is in this case driven by the desire to inherit family assets or to 
insure that those left behind are taking care of his/her assets back home. It can also be that 
after a certain period of time, the migrant intends to return home, and thus remits money to 
accumulate assets as an investment for the future. These two motives to remit are not 
mutually exclusive. Often, the case lies somewhere between these two extremes. Therefore 
                                               
8 OECD (2005), page 16
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Lucas and Stark (1985) developed a new model to explain the motivation to remit, called 
“tempered altruism” or “enlightened self interest”. In this model the migrant and the family at 
home mutually benefit from migration, through some kind of implicit contractual agreement.
For a household as a whole, there may be a Pareto-superior strategy to allocate certain 
members as migrants, and remittances should be the mechanism for redistributing the gains.9
Stark (1991), as well as Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) and Guibert (2002), suggest that the 
family can function as an insurance company that provides members with protection against 
income shocks by diversifying the sources of income. On the other hand, Poirine (1997) and 
Ilahi and Jafarey (1999) model the family as a bank that finances migration for some 
members. The borrowers remit funds in order to repay the loans, which are put toward more 
loans to further the interests of other individual family members.10
So far only microeconomic determinants of remittances have been considered, but in order to 
have an encompassing view of the remittances situation, macroeconomic determinants need 
also to be mentioned.  To clarify the intermediate relationships between the determinants and 
effects of remittances, Russell (1986) set out a framework of factors that affect: the total pool 
of remittance income, the decision whether or not to remit, the amount to remit, the way to 
remit and the uses of remittance incomes. The macroeconomic factors in this framework are: 
number of workers, wage rates, economic activity in host country, economic activity in 
sending country, exchange rate, relative interest rate between labor-sending and receiving 
countries, political risk factors in sending country and facility of transferring funds. Below 
follows Russell’s model of a remittance system where these determinants are listed and the 
expected direction of the relationship between them and the five “intermediate effects” of 
remittance are specified. As can be seen, microeconomic factors are also included in this 
framework.
                                               
9 Ibid, page 17
10Quoted by Chami, Fullenkamp, Jahjah (2003), page 6
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Table 1    The remittance system: determinants and intermediate effects 
POTENTIAL 
DETERMINANTS OF 
REMITTANCES
Expected 
direction of 
relationship
Available pool 
of remittances
Decision to 
remit or 
not
How 
to 
remit
Amount 
to remit
Uses
Number of workers 
Wage rates Economic activity in 
Host country 
Economic activity in sending 
country 
Exchange rate 
Relative Interest rate between 
labour-sending and receiving 
countries 
Political risk factors in sending 
country 
Facility of transferring funds 
Ratio of females in population in 
host country 
Years since out migration 
Household income level 
Employment of other household 
members 
Marital status 
Level of education 
Occupational level of migrants
+ 
+/-
+
+ 
+/-
+/-
-
+ 
-
+/-
-
-
+ 
-
-
X 
X 
X 
X 
?
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X
X 
X 
X 
?
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X
X 
X 
XT> 
? 
X 
X
Source: Russell (1986) “Remittances from international migration: A review in    perspective”, World   
Developmenf. Vol. 14. page 679
2.2 Use of remittances
The empirical evidence on the use of remittances is quite diverse and even contradicting, 
mainly because the studies on this issue only consider one country at a time. The way in 
which remittances are used is what determines their effect on the economy. So if remittances 
go to productive investment, education and health they have positive growth effects through 
increased output and productivity. If they on the other hand are only spent on consumption 
their effects depend on wether the consumed goods are locally produced or imported. If they 
are locally produced, a multiplier effect is generated and remittances thus have an indirect 
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contribution to growth by encouraging investment in related industries. But, if they are spent 
on imported consumer goods, besides the positive multiplier effect on the economy they also 
tend to have a negative effect on the balance of payments. We stated earlier that the primary 
motive for remitting money is altruism. This directly implies that remittances are 
compensatory income for remittance receivers (they increase when receiver’s income 
decreases). It is thus logical to assume that most remittances are mainly spent on consumption 
of daily necessities (consumer goods). This is supported by numerous studies: From a 
household survey in 22 Mexican communities Massey and Parrado (1994) found that two 
thirds of remittances go to consumption- mainly on food and maintenance followed by 
housing.11 Similar spending patterns are found by Glytsos (1993)12 for Greece and Gilani 
(1981)13 for Pakistani households. 
Some literature on remittance use also shows that a significant part of remittances go to 
investments and savings. For example: in a case study in the Fuijan province of China (the 
home town of half a million international migrants), Zhu finds that migrants are core agents in 
the development of the region, mainly through investments in physical and human capital. It 
is well documented in numerous studies that the dramatic development of China in the last 
decades has mainly been concentrated along its coastal areas. Although this may be attributed 
to many factors, including its favorable location, it is noteworthy that Chinese overseas and 
Chinese in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan have been the major sources of foreign investment 
in China.14
In a study based on the Pakistan rural household survey (PRHS) 2001-2002 Mausuri finds 
that remittances are indeed invested in physical capital such as farm machinery and 
agricultural land, tractors and tube wells, as well as human capital such as schooling and early 
childhood growth.15 Egypt is another example where remittances have been used in 
investment and productive activities. Return migrants are responsible for 15% of the capital 
invested in small enterprises and 15% of the associated employment generation.16 As far as 
savings are concerned, development theory maintains that the propensity to save out of 
transitory income is higher than the propensity to save out of permanent income (see for 
example Gersovitz, 1988). Ample empirical evidence shows that saving out of remittances, 
                                               
11 Massey, Parrado (1994)
12 Glytsos (1993)
13 Gilali (1981)
14 Zhu (2006), page 169
15 Mansuri (2007)
16 Wahaba (2005), page 188 
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which are considered as temporary income, is indeed much higher than savings from regular 
earnings in the home country.17
The pessimistic view on migrants’ role in development (Hugo 1998:146, Massey et al 1998) 
argues that because the majority of remittances are used for consumption, they are not 
considered as being used in productive investment. However, not only directly invested 
remittances should be considered as investments. Expenditure on education and health are in 
fact investments in human capital and are very likely to increase productive capacity in the 
long run. Moreover, if remittances are saved in financial intermediaries they are loaned to 
investors, thus indirectly contributing to productive investment. An important characteristic of 
remittances is that they are fungible by nature – they free up other resources. So even if 
remittances are not directly used for investment by the households receiving this money, they 
can free the households’ other resources to finance investment. 
Having said that altruism and self interest are the main determinants of remittances and that 
remittances are used primarily for the provision of basic needs but also invested in productive 
activities, there is no doubt that remittances improve the standards of living for the receiving 
households. The critical question is wether they have a positive growth/development effect on 
the receiving economy as a whole.
2.3 The impact of remittances on poverty and inequality
There exist two extreme views on the relation between remittances and poverty, an optimistic 
and a pessimistic view. Proponents of the optimistic view argue that migration reduces 
poverty in the labor exporting areas by shifting the population from a low income rural sector 
into a relatively high-income urban economy. Remittances improve the standards of living for 
the receiving households and if the migrants are from poor households remittances contribute 
to poverty alleviation. The pessimistic scenario accepts that households involved in migration 
benefit but these beneficiaries may not include the poor. This because the poor households 
face constraints to migration- such as high costs and risk. The migrants are thus more likely to 
come from middle and high income groups and only contribute to the widening of income 
gaps. Further, if remittances are spent on imported goods migration can affect local 
                                               
17 Glytsos (2002), page 14
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production and decrease the income of the poor, consequently increasing poverty and 
inequality. 
Below follows a summary table of 10 studies which, through different methods analyze the 
impact of remittances on poverty and inequality.
Table 2: Studies on the impact of remittances on poverty and inequality
Author/s, 
Year, 
Country/area
Method Results
Richard H., 
Adams Jr., 
John Page
2003,
74 low & 
middle income 
countries
Cross country regression. 
Uses 3 poverty measures: 
Poverty headcount, poverty 
gap, squared poverty gap. 
Gini coefficient is used to 
measure inequality.
Estimates for the poverty headcount measure indicate 
that a 10% increase in the share of remittances in 
country GDP will lead to a 1.6% decline in the share 
of people living below the poverty line. The 
remaining two measures suggest that remittances 
have a larger effect on poverty: 10% increase in 
share of remittances will lead to a 2% decline in the 
depth and severity of poverty. Moreover, the impact 
of migration and remittances on poverty seems to 
vary according to regions of the developing world. 
IMF, 
2005
Cross country study (101 
countries over the period 
1970-2003)
The results suggest a strong link between poverty, 
wether measured using the poverty gap or the 
poverty headcount, and remittances. Though the 
impact may seem economically small: on average, 
2.5 % increase in remittances/GDP ratio is associated 
with 0.5 % decrease of people living in poverty.
Lipton
1980,
India, 
Regression analysis of data 
from 40 villages.
Migration increases rural inequality, both within and 
among villages, because pull migration allows the 
better off migrants to advance in better jobs, while 
push migration weakens the poor. Positive 
remittances go disproportionally to the better off 
townward migrants; international remitters who send 
back big sums are seldom from the poorest village 
groups. Remittances are thus unlikely to do much to 
reduce rural poverty.
Richard H., 
Adams Jr
1991/1993
Arab republic 
of Egypt
The study uses predicted 
income equations to 
estimate the changes that 
occur between two 
situations: when remittances 
are included in and
excluded from household 
income. 
International remittances have a small but positive 
effect on poverty. The results indicate that the 
number of households living in poverty declines by 
9.8%, when predicted per capita household income 
includes remittances. Remittances account for 14.7% 
of total income for poor households.
However, when remittances are included in predicted 
per capita household income, inequality increases. 
The main reason for this is that most of the migrants 
came from upper-income households.
Gustafsson B.,
Markonenn N.
1993,
Lesotho
The analysis is based on the 
Lesotho Household Budget 
Survey 1987. 
Simulations for size and structure of poverty are 
done assuming that remittances are removed. In this 
case, an additional 11% to 14% of the households 
would be classified as poor. But the simulated 
increase of poverty is much higher when aspects of 
severity of poverty are taken into account than when 
16
only the number of poor households is measured.
Acosta, 
Calderon, 
Fajnzylber, 
Lopez,
11 Latin 
American 
Countires
Household surveys and 
cross country regression 
analyses are used. Gini 
coefficient, 2 head count 
poverty indicators 
corresponding to extreme & 
moderate poverty.
With each percentage point increase in the share of 
remittances to GDP, the fraction of the population 
living in poverty is reduced by 0.4%. 9 out of 11 
countries exhibit higher Gini coefficients for non-
remittances incomes, suggesting that if remittances 
were exogenously eliminated inequality would 
increase.
Lopez, 
Cordova
2004,
Mexico
The study uses a cross-
section of Mexican
municipalities and analyzes 
wether as the fraction of 
remittance-receiving 
households in a 
municipality rises, 
development indicators 
improve.
Remittances do not seem to dent the incidence of 
extreme poverty in a statistically significant way. 
This might reflect the high cost of migration which 
only households above some given level might be 
able to pay for. However, increases in the fraction of 
households receiving international remittances are 
generally correlated with better schooling and health 
outcomes.
Taylor, Mora, 
Adams, Lopez-
Feldman
2005,
Mexico
The paper utilizes new data 
from the 2003 Mexico 
National Rural Household 
Survey, together with 
inequality and poverty 
decomposition techniques. 
International migration slightly increases rural 
inequality, whereas internal migrants are income 
equalizers. However, both international and internal 
migration have equalizing effects on incomes in 
high-migration areas18. International migrant 
remittances reduce rural poverty by a greater amount 
than internal migrant remittances do.
Richard H., 
Adams Jr.
2006,
Ghana
Uses Ghana Living 
Standards Survey 1998/99. 
Uses econometric 
estimations to predict the 
income of households with 
and without remittances.
Remittances have a greater poverty-reducing effect 
when measured by more sensitive poverty measures: 
Poverty gap and squared poverty. The latter measure 
shows that including international remittances in 
household expenditure reduces severity of poverty by 
34.8%.
Remittances have a small impact on inequality. With 
the receipt of international remittances the Gini 
coefficient increases by 3.5%.
Richard H., 
Adams Jr.
2004,
Guatemala
The study is based on data 
from national household 
survey (7276 households). 
Predicted income functions 
are used to estimate the 
income status of households 
when remittances are 
included and excluded.
Remittances reduce level, depth and severity of 
poverty. The greatest impact is on severity – the 
squared poverty gap decreases by 19.8% when 
international remittances are included in the 
household income. This is because households from 
the lowest decile group receive a great proportion of 
their total income from remittances. Households in 
the bottom group receiving international remittances 
receive 60% of their total income from this source. 
Remittances have on the other hand little impact on 
income inequality. Most of the poverty reducing 
effects of remittances come from increases in mean 
per capita income rather than from any progressive 
change in income inequality caused by these income 
flows.
                                               
18 These findings reinforce the argument advanced in Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) that expansion of 
migration has an initially unequalizing effect on the rural income distribution, but the diffusion of access to 
migration eventually makes the effect of remittances on rural incomes more equitable.
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As can be seen, the evidence on the impacts of remittances on poverty and inequality vary 
depending on country, pattern of migration and poverty measure. Generally, the correlation 
between remittances and poverty reduction is positive but there seems to be an indication that 
remittances have a larger effect on reducing the severity of poverty, than level of poverty. The 
impacts on inequality are contradicting between studies, mainly due to the pattern of 
migration. When remittances are associated with higher inequality it is mainly either because 
overall migrants come from higher income groups or that those who do come from higher 
income groups remit relatively greater amounts compared to the migrants from poor 
households.
2.4 The impact of remittances on the overall economy
The literature shows no consensus as to whether the net effect of remittances on the receiving 
country is positive or negative. Again, evidence varies among countries depending on what 
mechanisms/policies exist to utilize their use, because remittances are private transfers and 
market forces alone cannot channel them to productive uses. Remittances are inflows of 
foreign exchange into the receiving country. Given the persistent problems in the balance of 
trade in LDCs, the limited effect of foreign aid, and the difficulties of borrowing, migrant 
remittances can substitute for the lack of foreign exchange. Remittances can further be used to 
purchase capital goods, contributing to growth and the restructuring of the economy towards 
international competitiveness. In this respect, migration in the form of remittances can be 
considered as an exchange of abundant unskilled labor for scarce foreign exchange, which 
renders possible the financing of those capital goods.19
The potential risk is that LDC governments see remittances as a stable source of income and 
rely on them to finance deficits instead of adopting long-term economic policies to create a 
competitive domestic market.20  In this line of reasoning, the instability of remittances as a 
national source of income is of special concern. Birks and Sinclair (1980:1) view remittances 
as unpredictable because manpower demands can presumably have wide swings. They argue 
that just as remittances can rise rapidly due to a feverish build up of manpower demand, so 
too there can be a steep drop in remittances due to rapid repatriation. Their decline would thus 
                                               
19 Glytsos (2002), page 6
20 Chami,.,Fullenkamp, Jahjah (2003)
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be due to: 1) a decline in wage rates as overheated economies cool off; 2) a decline in real 
wage rates due to inflation that leaves less to send home; and 3) the propensity of workers to 
settle and be joined by family and thus have less incentive to remit. Therefore, dependency on 
the unpredictable remittances destroys the process of development.
Kritz and Keely (1981) question the effect of remittances on development, comparing this 
dependency to drug addiction. However, proponents of international migration argue that 
labor export is no more productive of dependency than export of commodities or trade in 
general.21
Another macroeconomic impact stemming from remittances inflow is the appreciation of the 
national currency as the total amount of money in the economy increases without affecting the 
inflation rate. However, this real appreciation of the exchange rate makes the country’s 
exports relatively more expensive and worsens the competitiveness of the sectors exposed to 
international competition. As a result, increasing imports and decreasing exports will cause a 
deficit in the external current account. This phenomenon is known as the Dutch Disease (see 
Bourdet & Falck, 2006). Other negative effects include the potential impact of remittances on 
inflation and wage rate. Remittances are expected to increase demand for goods and services. 
If this demand is not met by responsive supply, inflation rises, sometimes to such a level as to 
annihilate the positive effects of remittances on development. The increased demand may also 
lead to a rise in wages and in turn shift the production to non-traded goods and, again, harm 
the competitiveness of the exporting sector. The wage increase can also come from reduced 
labor supply caused by increased leisure of recipients.22
As stated earlier, remittances also contribute to increased savings and investment. However, 
some studies show a negative relationship between remittances and growth. Chami, R., 
Fullenkamp, C., Jahjah, S. (2003) show empirically that remittances tend to be compensatory 
in nature and have a negative effect on economic growth. They also show that moral hazard 
problems created by remittances can be severe enough to reduce economic activity.23
In conclusion: there are two opposing views on the impact of remittances. The negative view 
which is built on four arguments: dependency, instability, developmental distortion and a 
                                               
21 Keely,Tran, (1989) page 503
22 Glytsos (2002) page 18
23 Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003), page 21.
Moral hazard occurs when the receiver takes advantage of the remitter by substituting the remittance money for 
labour. This decreases labour supply in the receiving country.
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resulting economic decline that overshadows the temporary advantage for a fortunate minority 
of beneficiaries.24 And the positive view which turns each of these arguments on its head. 
Remittances are responsive to market forces, provide resources for a transition to otherwise 
unsustainable development, improve income distribution, and help a significant part of 
society improve its quality of life25
                                               
24 Keely, Tran, (1989), page 3
25 Ibid, page 5
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3. Migration in Albania
3.1 An overview from 1990 onwards
After the fall of communism, Albanians gained the right to move freely within and outside the 
country as the Parliament approved the law on fundamental human rights in 1991. Hence, the 
first Albanian mass emigration began (the so called “embassy migration”) as thousands of 
Albanians sought refuge in western embassies in Tirana, in hope of leaving poverty behind 
and starting a better life in the prosperous neighboring countries. Below follows a brief 
summary of migration trends since 1990 in chronological order:
1991: During the first years of democracy in Albania, 25,000 migrants fled to southern Italy. 
Of these 20.000 were repatriated back. At the same time, mass emigration to Greece was 
taking place, but this is less well-documented. About 100,000 Albanians were forcibly 
repatriated back to Albania during the Greek “sweep-up” operations in December 1991.26
Altogether, between 1991 and 1992, an estimated 300,000 Albanians left the country. 27
1993-1996: Migration continues due to high unemployment as factories and plants are shut 
down. However, migration is more stable during this period as this is a period of economic 
growth in Albania. The figures show an estimate of 400,000 emigrants for the mid 90s, with 
Greece as the main destination country28.
1997: This is a year of political and economic unrest in the country and even civil war in 
some parts, resulting mainly from the break-down of the financial system caused by some 
investment schemes29.  During this year another mass emigration took place, mainly to Italy 
and Greece but also onward migration to other EU countries such as France, Germany and 
Belgium was evident.
1999: Another migration outflow followed with the political crisis in Kosova in 1999. During 
this year about half a million Kosovar refugees sought shelter in Albania as they were fleeing 
from the ethnic cleansing of the Serbian regime. As they later on sought asylum in European 
countries, many Albanian citizens mixed themselves in with them.
                                               
26 Barjaba, King (2005), page10
27 Carletto et al. (2006), page 770
28 Vullnetari (2007), page 33
29 The link between these schemes and remittances will be briefly explained in chapter six.
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2000-2007: This period marks the end of large scale mass migration in Albania, although 
Carletto et al. (2006: 782) argue that migration levels remained rather high during 2001-
2002.30  
By the end of 2008, over 1 million people or more than 25% of Albanian citizens, and over 
35% of the Albanian workforce were estimated to be living abroad.31 It should be noted that 
there is no consensus over the exact number of migrants in total or for each destination 
country. Exact calculations become difficult given the high mobility of migrants and that 
much of migration is illegal or periodical. Data that exist come from two types of sources: 
Albanian and destination country sources.
3.2 Structure and profile of migrants
The latest Migration Profile done by IOM in Albania estimates the following figures:
Number of emigrants: 860,485 (2005, World Bank)
As percentage of total population: 27.5% (2005, World Bank)
Gender ratio: 75% male/25% female (INSTAT)
                 Table 3: Main Countries of Destination for Albanian Emigrants
Country Number Year Source
Greece 434,810 2003 European Commission Annual Report on 
Statistics on Migration, Asylum and Return
Italy 348,813 2006 ISTAT Italian Statistics Office
USA 113,661 2000 US Census
UK 50,000 2005 Ministry of Labor, Social affairs and 
Employment and Equal Opportunities, 
Albania
Canada 14,935 2001 Canadian Consensus
Germany 11,630 2002 Federal Statistics Office
                    Source: IOM Migration Profile 2007
The largest flows of emigrants originate in the countryside, where the economic situation is 
considerably worse than in urban areas.32 According to WB estimates’, by 2002 temporary 
international migration from rural households accounted for about two thirds of total 
                                               
30 Vullnetari (2007), page 35
31 Gedeshi I (2008), page 205
32 De Zwager, Gedeshi, Germenji, Nikas (2005) page 12
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migration.33 Since this study focuses on poverty reduction, it is worth mentioning that it 
appears that the poorest of the poor cannot migrate, not only because of the lack of financial 
capital, but also because of limited social capital which would crucially allow them to borrow 
from businesses locally, so that the family survives until the migrant returns.34 Furthermore, 
they lack human capital, because, as will be shown below, the chances to migrate are 
positively correlated to the educational level.
Migrant occupation: The main sectors of male Albanian emigrant employment in Greece are 
construction (49%) and Agriculture (21%). In Italy the primary sectors are construction 
(43%), manufacturing (19%) and services (16%) for men. In both neighboring countries 
women are primarily occupied by domestic work. In the United Kingdom, construction and 
services are the two main sectors of occupation for men (33% and 32% respectively), while 
for women the services sector seems the most “preferred” (66%).35
Education Level of migrants and brain drain: Considering that the first 9 years of education 
are compulsory in Albania, most migrants have at least completed primary school. Studies 
indicate that the likelihood of migration increases with the level of education (Germenji and 
Swinnen 2004, Konica 1999). A comprehensive study done in rural Albania shows that none
of the migrants is illiterate and, on average, they have almost 2 years more of schooling than 
non-migrants. (10 versus 8.3 years of schooling).36
The emigration rate of tertiary educated is quite high and estimated at 20% by the World 
Bank.37 Every year, highly qualified professionals emigrate due to unsatisfactory 
working/living conditions in Albania. Evidence from the CESS Data Banks 1 and 2 estimates
that the pool of Albanian academics holding a PhD, and working in universities, laboratories, 
research institutions and research departments in industrialized countries comprises some 200 
persons. This pool of academics is concentrated in a number of countries: USA (26%), France 
(25%), England (9%), Austria (6%) and Germany (5%), and the remaining 29% in Canada, 
Italy, Switzerland, Holland and Greece. For a small country like Albania, this is not an 
insignificant number. This process of brain drain has been going on since early 1990 – a 
recent CESS survey shows that more than half of the lecturers and researchers of the 
                                               
33 World Bank (2005)
34 Vullnetari (2007), page 46
35 De Zwager, Gedeshi, Germenji, Nikas (2005)
36 Germenji, Swinnen (2005)
37 World Bank (2005)
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universities and research institutions of Albania emigrated during the period 1991-2005, 47% 
of them aged 25-34 at the time of emigration.38 As a result, the Albanian higher educational 
system has weakened substantially for the last years. Such a loss of human capital and 
potential is fatal to a country like Albania which is in its early stage of state rebuilding and 
democracy and is struggling to build its path to the integration in the European Union and 
world markets. Moreover, it is estimated that over 25,000 young Albanians are currently 
studying abroad and many hundreds are attending Masters or PhD programs at universities in 
industrialized countries. Many of these have no willingness to return to Albania in current 
conditions.39
3.3 Motives and characteristics of Albanian Migration
Three types of international migration can currently be identified in Albania. First, short-term 
international migration (for periods of days, weeks, or months), almost exclusively to Greece, 
particularly from bordering regions; second, long-term international migration, to Greece, 
Italy as well as to other countries of the European Union; and third, legal long-term 
international migration to the US and Canada.40
In their National Strategy of Migration, the Albanian government identifies the 3 main 
motives behind the decision to emigrate: 
1. Economic Factors- such as lack of employment opportunities and poor living 
conditions. 
2. Public security: Civil unrest is the other main cause of emigration – Many Albanian 
professionals with a good financial situation have immigrated to safer and more 
prosperous countries to ensure a safer life for themselves and their families.
3. Weak institutions: Corruption and organized crime are two widely accepted features of 
state institutions. This paralyses their normal functioning and results in the skepticism 
of the citizens for improvement of the social, political and economic situation in the 
country.
Besides these push factors, there are also pull factors that attract Albanians to leave their 
country. These are: higher wages in the west and labor market demand for cheap labor force 
in fields such as agriculture, construction, tourism etc.; better living conditions; better 
                                               
38 Gedeshi (2006), page 116
39 Ibid, page 126
40 Carletto, Davis, Stampini, Zezza,(2004)
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opportunities for the future of immigrants’ children; personal development; the glamorous 
image of life in the West as portrayed by foreign television, particularly in the Italian case.41
In 2000 Barjaba first suggested an “Albanian model” of emigration. In this model, Albanian 
emigration is characterized by the following features: It is intense (a rate of emigration much 
higher than any other Eastern bloc country); it is largely economically driven – a form of 
survival migration; it has a high degree of irregularity, with many undocumented migrants; it 
displays lots of to-and-fro movement, especially with Greece; and it is dynamic and rapidly 
evolving, especially as regards new destinations and routes of migration.42
                                               
41 Mai (2002)
42 Vullnetari (2007), page 40
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4. Remittances in Albania, development and patterns
4.1 Trends
Remittances in Albania have been continuously growing since 1992, from 10 to 22% of the 
country’s GDP. They exceeded by several times the amount of FDI in the country, exports as 
well as the amount of aid received from international institutions.43 During the 1992-2001 
period the accumulated FDI was 774.7 million USD, while the accumulated remittance flow 
was 3 924.2 million USD or about 5 times more.44
Figure 1: Volume of Remittances in relation to FDI, Foreign Aid and Trade Deficit
However, it has been difficult to report exact figures and realistic assessment of the remittance 
flows to Albania, the reason being that large proportions of remittances are transferred 
through informal channels and are consequently not recorded in official data. Moreover, much 
of remittances are made in-kind such as long term durables, electronic equipment, clothing, 
cars etc. and are also left out of official records. Remittances in kind are estimated by De 
Zwager, Gedeshi, Germenji, Nikas (2005) to amount to 13.5% of total remittances, which is 
not an insignificant figure.
                                               
43 Bank of Albania (2008)
44 INSTAT (2002)
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Thus, the volume of remittances reported varies between different institutes, depending on the 
techniques they use in their estimations. The table below shows remittances in percentage of 
GDP for the period 1993-2005, as estimated by the Bank of Albania. 
Figure 2: Remittances in % of GDP, 1993-2005
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The 2007 total remittances are estimated to be 947 million Euros (slightly growing at 1.3% 
/year) or 12% of GDP. This growth rate is arguably the lowest in the last 10 years.45
In per capita terms, remittances rose from around USD 100 in early 1990s to more than USD 
200 in 2002 and to almost USD 400 in 2007.46 Remittances are expected to decrease as 
emigrants complete family reunification or create own families and integrate in the host 
countries. Bonds with the family left behind in Albania weaken as new needs and expenses 
are born together with the new life abroad.  Many scholars think that a cycle exists in 
Albanian migration.47 De Zwager et al (2005) estimated the Albanian “emigration cycle” to 
be about 17 years. After this time, emigrants either wish to return to Albania, or permanently 
settle in the host country.
However, until 2007 there was no noticeable decrease in remittances in Albania. Ilir Gedeshi, 
expert in Albanian migration issues, proposes 3 reasons for this: 1. Migration in Albania has 
been on the rise during the whole period since 1991. 2. There has been a trend in migration 
away from lower income countries (Greece, Italy) towards higher income countries (USA, 
                                               
45 Bank of Albania (2007), page 59
46 Gedeshi (2008) 
47 See for example  Hatziprokopiou, H. and Labriandis, L. (2005)
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Canada). 3. “Dirty money” (earned from illegal activities) is also recorded as remittances in 
official accounts. On the other hand, the latest findings of CESS show maturation of the 
overall migration cycle, evidenced by the high level of legalization and unification of families 
in places of migration (90%). Consequently, remittances are expected to decrease, at the same 
time as migrant savings abroad increase.
4.2 Motives and characteristics of remittances
It is widely accepted that the determinants of remittances in Albania are an area that lacks 
adequate systematic research. One reason might be the relatively short period of emigration 
flows and the poor quality of data. But another reason is that it is difficult to test the motives 
to remit empirically. One such attempt was made by Hagen-Zanker & Siegel (2007) who used 
3 different econometric models to test for the motivations to remit in Albania and Moldova, 
but reached no significant results. They concluded that while there is some agreement on 
some remitting motives, e.g. altruism towards spouses, many of these results remain 
ambiguous due to a number of methodological problems. In real life behavior, altruism and 
self-interest are not as strictly defined as in theory. However, family bonds are one of the 
strongest elements which define Albanian culture and society. Over the years, the family has 
come to play the role of an institution which, besides bearing the normal function of a family, 
even aims at providing that kind of support which state structures fail to provide. Therefore, it 
can be stated with quite enough certainty that altruism is one of the main motives to remit.
Estimates by the IOM48 show that 68.6% of emigrants send remittances back home to 
Albania. The most common recipients are the parents of the sender, then spouse and children, 
followed by extended family. Albanian tradition obliges men more than women to have 
economic responsibilities towards their families, and females are expected to show this 
obligation towards the families of their husbands instead of their own. Studies thus show that 
the amount remitted is positively correlated to males (Gedeshi et al 2003) – it is more the 
married sons than the married daughters that send remittances home to their parents. The 
amount remitted is positively affected by the emigrants’ educational level (Gedeshi et al, 
2003; Germenji 2000; Germenji et al,2002) ,wages and marital status; married emigrants with 
                                               
48 IOM (2007), page 17
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families remaining in Albania tend to send significantly more in comparison to their 
counterparts (Gedeshi et al, 2003; Germenji 2004; Konica 1999)49.
4.3 Transfer channels
Formal channels: The formal sector of capital transfers is composed by the Banking Sector 
and the Money Transfer Operators. To send remittances through the banking sector is a quite 
complex procedure which requires that the banking institutes are established both in the host 
and receiving country. The results of the emigrant household survey undertaken by IOM in 
Albania in 2005 indicate that among emigrants that remit to their households/relatives in 
Albania, the banking system remains the least preferred formal channel – only 9% report it as 
a preferred channel50. MTOs dominate the formal market for money transfers. There are two 
MTOs currently operating in Albania – Western Union and Money Gram.  Although these 
charge higher fees they are more preferred since they offer faster services, are wider spread 
across the territory of Albania and do not require a bank account for the sender and more 
importantly for the receiver. The same study shows that households in Albania are 
considerably less familiar with the banking system than the emigrants in the host countries -
only 45.3% of all household in Albania have a bank account (compared to 74.4% of emigrants 
in host countries). This is especially true for rural households.
Informal channels: Remittances sent through informal channels are hand-carried by the 
remitters themselves, or through family members and friends. Paid couriers are another form 
of informal transfer, but not so popular. 
The use of informal transfer mechanisms poses real costs to the society as a whole. Firstly, it
prevents the Bank of Albania from fully measuring the presence of foreign currency in the 
country, which in turn complicates the conduct of monetary and stabilization policies. 
Secondly, remittances sent this way do not become available for intermediation since they 
rarely enter the banking system.
Figures from the Bank of Albania show an increasing trend in the use of formal transfer 
channels from mid 90s and onwards. The use of formal channels even increased after the 
                                               
49 De Zwager et al (2005), page 23
50 Ibid, page 28
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pyramid schemes in 1997 (when in fact one would expect a substantial decrease due to loss of 
confidence in the banking sector).
Table 4 shows a continuous increase of formal transfer channels used, both in absolute and 
relative terms. As can be seen, the use of formal channels during this period has, in absolute 
terms, increased more than 150 times! 
Table 4: Remittances of Albanian emigrants, million USD (percent), total, formal and
informal channels, 1994-2004
Year Formal Channels Informal Channels Total
1994 10.0 (7.5%) 1000 (92.5%) 100.0
1995 210.2 (15.5%) 93.0 (84.5%) 101.8
1996 212.0 (12.0%) 125.7 (88.0%) 132.2
1997 295.4 (31.3%) 52.4 (68.7%) 70.6
1998 401.8 (25.1%) 96.9 (74.9%) 119.7
1999 314.8 (24.2%) 79.8 (75.8%) 97.4
2000 575.3 (30.7%) 105.3 (69.3%) 140.5
2001 861.8 (39.7%) 106.1 (60.3%) 162.7
2002 997.5 (44.7%) 99.9 (55.3%) 167.1
2003 1,096.5 (39.9%) 133.8 (60.1%) 205.9
2004 1,660.7 (45.7%) 159.6 (54.3%) 272.0
                                  Source: Bank of Albania, 2005
If the set of data in the table (absolute terms) is compared to estimations of the WB (2005) 
and BOA 2008 (fig. 1), it is clear that these figures are considerably lower (in total). WB 
estimates a total of 400 million USD of remittances received in Albania during 2005– a figure 
considered by them as an underestimation of total remittance flows as it ignores foreign 
earnings and savings brought back in person by migrants. BoA (2008) gives an estimate of 
about 1000 million USD for the same year. This demonstrates the problems with collecting 
unified data about remittance flows- even within an institute, the figures differ from year to 
year (as is the case with BoA).
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5. Poverty in Albania–Incidence, spatial distribution and 
characteristics
5.1 Poverty and poverty measures
Although it is widely agreed that poverty is a state of being with many more dimensions than 
strictly the income dimension (which classical literature emphasizes the most), it is difficult to 
measure the non-income aspects of poverty. Therefore, the most widely used measurement of 
poverty is income-poverty. Income poverty is defined as the lack of sufficient income to meet 
minimum consumption needs. This minimum level of income is usually called the "poverty 
line". Every country has a National Poverty Line, which is derived by the Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP). There are two main ways of setting poverty lines in a relative or absolute way:
Absolute poverty lines are anchored in some absolute standard of what households should be 
able to count on in order to meet their basic needs.51 The absolute poverty line in Albania is 
set at 4891 Albanian Lek/month (about 47USD). The most common measurement of income 
poverty is the Headcount index (also called poverty rate). This index gives the incidence of 
poverty, i.e the percentage of the population whose per capita incomes/expenditures are below 
the poverty line, and is derived by dividing the number of people below the poverty line by 
the total population. However, this index is only a descriptive one and does not capture 
aspects of poverty which are important for policy-making, such as depth and severity of 
poverty. For example, the headcount ratio does not change when a part of the population 
becomes poorer, or a very poor group becomes less poor. Therefore, other measures of 
poverty need to be used to measure how far below the poverty line the poor are situated, and 
how severe poverty is. The measures I will use to describe poverty in Albania are the 
Headcount ratio, depth of poverty and severity of poverty.
Depth of poverty is measured by the poverty gap index which is a combined measurement of 
the incidence of poverty and depth of poverty. It shows how far from the poverty line the poor 
are situated and is defined by: 
                                               
51http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20242879
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Severity of poverty is in addition sensitive to inequality among poor. The poverty severity 
index gives more weight to very poor than to less poor and is defined as:  
Relative poverty lines are defined in relation to the overall distribution of income or 
consumption in a country; for example the poverty line could be set at 50% of the country’s 
mean income or consumption. While absolute poverty is measured by comparing a person’s 
total income against the total cost of purchasing a basket of goods and services representing 
the basic needs of daily life, relative poverty compares a person’s total income and spending 
patterns with those of the general population. 
Inequality is a key concept when analyzing poverty. Income inequality is the existence of 
disproportionate distribution of total national income among households whereby the share 
going to rich persons in a country is far greater than that going to poorer persons. The most 
common measure of inequality is the Gini-Coefficient. The Gini coefficient is measured 
graphically by the Lorenz Curve, dividing the area between the perfect equality line and the 
Lorenz curve by the total area lying to the right of the equality line in a Lorenz diagram. The 
Gini coefficient ranges income inequality from 0 to 1. The higher the value of the coefficient, 
the higher is the inequality of income distribution.52
                                               
52 Definitions taken from Todaro, Smith (2006), page 814 and 816
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5.2 Poverty trends in Albania
5.2.1 Rural-Urban poverty
As expected, the majority of the poor live in rural areas. All three poverty measures are 
significantly higher in rural areas than in urban – the incidence of poverty is almost 3 times 
higher in rural areas compared to Tirana, and twice as high compared to other urban areas. 
The lowest poverty is found in Tirana where the poverty gap is only 1.6% compared to 2.6% 
in other cities and 5.3% in rural areas. Also the severity of poverty is twice as high in rural 
areas as in cities, and almost 4 times higher than in Tirana.
Table 5, Figure 3
Absolute poverty by Urban 
Rural,2005
Area Poverty measure
Tirana Headcount 8.1
Depth 1.6
Severity 0.5
Other Urban Headcount 12.4
Depth 2.6
Severity 0.9
Rural Headcount 24.2
Depth 5.3
Severity 1.8
Total Headcount 18.5
Depth 4
Severity 1.3
Source: LSMS 2005
5.2.2 Regional  poverty
The poorest of the four defined regions is the Mountain region.53 There are considerable 
differences in all poverty measures between this region compared to the Coast, and especially 
Tirana. These differences were substantially higher in 2002, but as a result of regional 
                                               
53 It is important to note that these broadly defined regions are not the same as administrative regions –
commonly referred to as prefectures. Rather, these are areas that have been grouped together because they share 
similar geographic contiguity and endowments. There are four such areas defined for survey purposes, while 
there are 12 prefectures (WB 2005)
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convergence during 2002-2005, especially the mountain areas have narrowed their distance 
with Coast, Central and Tirana. The Central region is the second poorest, but with highest 
severity of poverty (1.8% compared to 1.5% in the Mountain and 1% in the Costal regions). 
Also, in regional terms, Tirana remains the area with lowest incidence, depth and severity of 
poverty.
Table 6, Figure 4
Absolute poverty by stratum,2005
Stratum Poverty measure
Coast Headcount 16.2
Depth 3.2
Severity 1
Central Headcount 21.2
Depth 5
Severity 1.8
Mountain Headcount 25.6
Depth 5.1
Severity 1.5
Tirana Headcount 8.1
Depth 1.6
Severity 0.5
Total Headcount 18.5
Depth 4
Severity 1.3
Source: LSMS 2005
5.2.3 Poverty reduction 
The only means-tested anti-poverty program in Albania is the “Ndihma Ekonomike” program. 
It aims to provide support to rural households with very small landholdings and urban 
households with no other income source. The program was established in 1993 in reaction to 
persistent unemployment and rising social chaos following the breakdown of the communist 
regime. The largest receivers of social help from this program were rural households (16.5% 
compared to 8.5% urban) and households from the Mountain region, followed by the central 
region, Coastal region and lastly Tirana. The benefit level per recipient family was about 2113 
Lek/month (2006) (in 2009 exchange rates that is about 19euros).
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Table 7: Percentage of households concerned by Ndihma Ekonomike by Poverty status
and region, poor includes extreme poor
Ext. Poor Poor Non-
Poor
All
Coastal 12.3% 9.7% 2.8% 3.6%
Central 60.2% 41.6% 13.0% 17.9%
Mountain 60.7% 45.0% 29.9% 32.9%
Tirana 42.5% 19.7% 2.0% 3.0%
Urban 52.4% 32.9% 6.3% 8.5%
Rural 50.0% 32.4% 12.7% 16.5%
Albania 50.7% 32.5% 9.5% 12.7%
                               Source: LSMS 2005
Poverty reduction between 2002 and 2005 was impressively large – 41% of the poor 
population in urban areas and 24% in rural areas were helped out of poverty. Generally, 
absolute poverty declined from 25.4% to 18.5% between 2003- 2005 and extreme poverty54
from 5% to 3.5%. Also, the poverty gap and the severity of poverty declined during this 
period. According to WB, INSTAT, BOA, this success is mostly attributed to the high 
economic growth which Albania has been experiencing since 1992. Evidence shows that most 
of the reduction in poverty is due to high growth in mean incomes in a fairly stable inequality 
context – meaning that growth has been pro-poor in Albania. The other way from which 
changes in poverty can occur is through redistribution to the lower tail of the distribution, 
even when there is no change in average mean incomes.
5.2.4 Poverty reduction by region
If we look at poverty reduction by region we see that there are quite big differences between 
the developments in the Mountain area and Tirana on the one hand and the coastal and central 
regions on the other hand. During 2002-2005 Tirana experienced the highest rates in poverty 
reduction among the regions, with a 54.5% reduction in the poverty headcount, 57.9% in 
depth and 61.5% in severity of poverty. The high rates of poverty reduction in the Mountain 
regions, which are predominantly rural and poor, are rather surprising. Severity of poverty 
decreased by an impressive 63.4% and depth and headcount poverty by 54.1% and 42,5% 
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respectively, all almost twice as high as on the coast! The lowest poverty redaction rates were
recorded in the central regions where no improvement took place in the severity of poverty.
Figure 5: Poverty reduction by Stratum, 2002-2005
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According to the WB55, migration explains, in part, the observed trends of poverty reduction. 
Firstly, Tirana and the Mountain rural regions are the areas with the largest increase in the 
share of households receiving remittances during the period 2002-2005. Secondly, the amount 
of remittances has also increased substantially – more than doubled in Tirana and increased 
by 50% in the Mountain regions. And lastly, the impressive pace of poverty reduction in the 
Mountain regions is explained by the continuing outflow of new permanent international 
migration. 
5.2.5 Characteristics of the poor
The characteristics of the poor can be established by looking at the incidence of poverty. In 
Albania, the incidence of poverty rises with size of family, illiteracy and lower education 
level, and of course – unemployment. The risk of poverty is also considerably higher for self 
employed (46%) than employees (14%). In 2001, self employment in rural areas accounted
                                               
55 WB (2007)
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for 89.8% of total employment, compared to only 39% in urban areas.56 A surprising 
observation is that households headed by females have a lower incidence of poverty. 
According to the WB, part of the explanation may be that these female-headed households 
live in households with migrants who boost household incomes through remittances. 
Moreover, the incidence of poverty is rising for younger heads of households. 90% of the 
poor live in rural Albania, which is characterized by lack of infrastructure, high population 
density and unemployment.
5.2.6 Income inequality 
Inequality in Albania is considered low and by the standard of the most commonly used 
measure, Gini, it remains low57. Inequality is slightly higher in urban regions compared to 
rural (0.297 and 0.273 respectively). The highest inequality is noted in Tirana followed by the 
Coastal areas, Central areas and lastly the Mountain regions.
Table 8: Income inequality in 2005 measured by the GINI coefficient
Gini
National 0.296
Urban 0.297
Rural 0.273
Coast 0.294
Central 0.286
Mountain 0.241
Tirana 0.298
                                                                  Source: LSMS 2005
From 2002 there has been a modest increase in inequality in all areas (generally from 0.282 to 
0.296) except for the mountain regions which have actually experienced a decline in 
inequality (from 27.1 to 24.1)
                                               
56 SIDA (2006), page 39. 
Self employed includes employers and unpaid family members
57 WB (2007), page 9
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6. Remittances and Poverty in Albania
6.1 Distribution of remittances
According to LSMS 2002, remittances from emigrants represent 13% of the average 
household income, while for recipient households they represent 47% of the household 
income.58 87% of total remittances are sent by split-off migrants59 (who are estimated to be 
around 451,000) and the average amount remitted is UDS 1,179. The remaining 13% is sent 
by other distant relatives or friends.60 Before moving on to see how remittances are distributed 
across regions, it should be noted that 44.5% of split-off migrants originate from the coast, 
39% from central regions, 10.5% from Tirana and only 7% from mountain regions. Figure 6
shows that the pattern of remittance-receiving households (as a percent of total households) is 
in line with this ranking. The highest level of remittance-receiving households is in the coastal 
regions, followed by the central regions, Tirana and lastly mountain areas. However, 
proportionally speaking, the largest receivers are from the mountain areas (74% of split-offs 
from the mountain areas send remittances), while the lowest are from the coastal areas (60%). 
The proportions of emigrant households receiving remittances in the central areas and Tirana 
are 70% and 65% respectively.
As can be seen, the evidence on the impacts of remittances on poverty and inequality vary 
depending on country, pattern of migration and poverty measure. Generally, the correlation 
between remittances and poverty reduction is positive but there seems to be an indication that 
remittances have a larger effect on reducing the severity of poverty than level of poverty. The 
impacts on inequality are contradicting between studies, mainly due to the pattern of 
migration. When remittances are associated with higher inequality it is mainly either because 
overall migrants come from higher income groups or that those who do come from higher 
income groups remit relatively greater amounts compared to the migrants from poor 
households.
                                               
58 IMF (2005)
59 Defined as members of a nuclear family who have been away from the household since 1990 and now live 
abroad.
60 WB (2007)
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Figure 6: Percentage of households receiving remittances by region, 2005
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Regarding the amount of remittances, it is interesting to note that although a small portion of 
emigration comes from the mountain regions, split-offs from these areas tend on average to 
remit the highest amounts – almost twice as much as the central areas. This means that 
proportionally more and larger amounts are flowing into the poorer mountain region 
compared to the richer areas of the country.61 In general, split offs from rural areas send more 
than their counterparts from urban areas in the same region (see fig. below). This can have 
positive effects on poverty alleviation since the majority of the poor (90%) are situated in the 
rural areas of the country.
                                               
61 WB (2007), page 45
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Figure 7: Average amount remitted to household (at 2005 prices, leks), 2005
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6.2 Use of remittances
The data below shows the use of remittances based on a household survey conducted by 
CESS with 1000 randomly selected emigrant households in 6 prefectures in Albania (where 
emigration is most prevalent). It shows the primary, secondary and tertiary use of remittances 
received from abroad. Some of the correspondents only spend their remittances on one 
category, or two and therefore the total number of correspondents is lower in the second and 
third column. As could be foreseen, the majority of households prioritize the use of 
remittances to finance living expenses (61.5%). 3.8% prioritize remittances for other purposes 
and 3.2% for business activity. The second most popular use of remittances is to buy 
household goods and the third for savings. None of the households use remittances primarily 
to finance education. Education comes only in second place for 0.9% of households, and third 
for 1.4% of households.
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Figure 8: Use of remittances, 2005
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Similar results were found by De Zwager and Gedeshi (2005). They found that the primarily 
remittances go to finance family daily needs, then comes building upgrading and furnishing 
the home, followed by investment in real estate. The propensity for beneficiaries of 
remittances to save a part of this income was quite high, and estimated to be about 20-30 %. 
However, the same is not true for investments in the dynamic sector of the economy. What 
little productive investment is achieved by the use of remittances is concentrated in the 
primary and tertiary sectors of the economy.
A fair share of the consumption growth (22.1% in urban and 10.6% in rural) that Albania has 
been experiencing in the last years is explained by remittances. The large pool of migrants 
and the remittances they send have contributed to consumption growth by reducing family 
size, financing consumption directly and providing working capital for business start-ups.62
In order to find out weather migrant remittances has an effect on the consumption patterns of 
recipient households Castaldo & Reilly (2002) use data from the 202 LSMS to estimate
budget share equations for four broadly defined categories of commodities: food, non-food, 
durables and utilities63. The estimated effects for the international remittance recipients are 
                                               
62 WB (2007), page 18
63 Description of expenditure categories: Food: Purchased products, non-purchased products (own produced and 
received as gift), food eaten outside home, items purchased before reference period; Non-food: Clothing and 
personal care, house cleaning, home improvements, transport, entertainment and hobbies, other products and 
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found to be statistically significant for all categories except non-food. The effect on food is
shown to be negative (i.e remittance receivers’ average budget share on food compared to 
non-receivers’ is 4.5% lower, ceteris paribus). The effects on durables and utilities, on the 
other hand, are shown to be positive. Receivers of international remittances spend on average 
25% more of their budget share on durables, and 16% more on utilities. Remittances thus 
allow households to improve their standards of living, by financing home appliances, use of 
electricity, gas, fuels for heating, access to water etc.
6.3 Impact of remittances on poverty
It has been widely acknowledged that since the start of mass emigration from Albania, in 
early 1990s, remittances have served as a survival strategy for poor families in the country, 
and emigration is perceived to be the most viable means to escape poverty. However, as for 
Albania, there is no empirical study that examines the impact of remittances on poverty 
reduction. But, several surveys in different parts of the country give evidence on the benefits 
of migration and remittances in poverty alleviation. 
6.3.1 Remittances, consumption and absolute poverty
Below follows a comparison between households with migrants abroad and those without 
regarding consumption and poverty, based on LSMS 2005 data. As is obvious, there are large 
differences in consumption levels as well as incidence and depth of poverty between 
households with permanent migrant/s abroad and those without. The incidence of poverty is 
almost half as low and the depth of poverty more than half as low for households with 
permanent migrants compared to households without such. Also per capita consumption is 
higher for migrant households – 9.856 lek compared to 8.813 lek for non-migrant households. 
These differences are all statistically significant at 99% level of significance. The outcomes 
between households with and without temporary migrants on the other hand show no marked 
differences.
                                                                                                                                                  
services; Durables: Domestic appliances, TV, computer, video and DVD-player, Vehicles (bicycle, motorcycle, 
car, truck tractor); Utilities: Electricity, gas and water, Telephone (landline, mobile, public phone), Fuels for 
home use (firewood, coal, kerosene, diesel)  
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Table 9: Poverty indicators and migrant households
Permanent migration Temporary  migration Total
no yes difference no yes difference
Per capita 
consumption*
8.813 9.856 1.043*** 9.202 8.943 -259 9.109
Poverty headcount 21.2 11.8 -9.4*** 18.6 18.4 -1.0 18.5
Poverty gap 4.7 2.2 -2.5*** 4.0 4.0 0.0 4.0
Number of 
obseravtions
2,486 1,154 2,544 1,069 3,640
*Computed at the individual level
***Significant at 99%level
Source: WB (2007)
From this set of data it can be concluded that remittances have a reducing effect of absolute 
poverty – both in the incidence and depth of poverty. Moreover, remittance receiving 
households also have a higher consumption level which implies a better standard of living. 
However, the data should be interpreted with caution, since it can for example be the case that 
households with permanent migrants already had a higher consumption per capita and lower 
poverty even before migration.
6.3.2 Remittances and Relative poverty
Due to the difficulty in assessing the impact of remittances on absolute poverty, I have chosen 
to look at the beneficiaries’ own perceptions about the role of remittances in their wellbeing. 
Results taken from CESS database, linked to households own perceptions about their 
financial situation will be presented, where the answers of remittance-receiving households 
and non-receiving households will be compared. Table 10 presents the results of “Perceptions 
on the remittance impact on the households’ financial situation” from a household survey
conducted by CESS in 2005 with 1004 randomly selected households. 42.3% of the 
beneficiaries declared a significant improvement of their financial situation due to 
remittances, compared to only 15.6% of the non-beneficiaries. The fraction of beneficiary 
households that declare no improvement is significantly lower compared to their counterparts 
– 1.3% and 58.8% respectively. Generally, 96.3% of the 895 remittance receiving households 
declare a POSITIVE impact of remittances on their financial situation, compared to only 
41.2% of the 109 households that don’t receive remittances.
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Table 10: Perceptions on the remittance impact on the households’ financial situation
Households that receive 
remittances
Households that don’t 
receive remittances
    
Total
Financial situation Nr. % Nr. % Nr. %
No improvement 33 3.7 64 58.8 97 9.66
A slight improvement 483 54.0 28 25.7 511 60.46
A significant 
improvement
379 42.3 17 15.6 396 99.90
Total 895 100.0 109 100.0 1004 100.0
Source: De Zwager, N., Gedeshi, I., Germenji, E., Nikas Ch., (2005)
The data below is taken from another household survey by CESS in collaboration with ETF, 
this time with 2000 households across 6 prefectures in Albania. These households belong to 
two groups: 1000 of them are potential migrants (labeled PM), and 1000 are families with 
return migrants (labeled Return). The answers to the question “Is you financial situation 
sufficient to meet your basic needs?” are presented in figure 9. Concentrating on the right tail
of the x-axis we see that generally, relatively fewer remittance-receiving households perceive 
their financial state to be “insufficient” and “not at all sufficient” (with an exception of return 
migrants who receive remittances and think their state is “not at all sufficient” – 1.1% 
compared to 0.7% for return migrants that do not receive remittances). We also notice that 
relatively more beneficiaries perceive their financial state to be “sufficient” than non-
beneficiaries. There are however no noticeable differences in the other two categories. 
Figure 9: Households’ perceptions about their financial situation
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Before drawing conclusions I finally look at the differences between the same set of groups 
but for another question, namely how they perceive their economic condition relative to 
others. The results are presented in figure 10 below.
Figure 10: Households’ perception about their financial situation compared to others
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Here we can distinguish a pattern for households that receive remittances. They seem to be 
fewer compared to their counterparts in perceiving their situation as “worse”, “much worse” 
or “same” as other families in the village. They are also relatively more who perceive their 
situation as “better” – 30.1% Potential migrant households and 30.5% of return migrants 
households, both who receive remittances, place themselves as being better off economically 
than other families in the village. These figures are 22.4% and 24% for non-beneficiaries. 
Again, there are no noticeable differences between households that do and do not receive 
remittances when it comes to the better extreme of this ladder. Generally, the pattern holds 
and is the same for both of these indicators – remittances seem to have an impact when it 
comes to easing households’ financial situation, but do not affect them in such a way as to 
distinguish them as being much better off than their counterparts. From this analysis I can 
conclude that, among these 2000 households, remittances seem to have a positive impact on 
easing poverty, but no noticeable impact on wealth accumulation. This conclusion reinforces 
the evidence that remittances are mainly spent on consumer goods to meet basic family needs.
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6.4 Impact of remittances on inequality
In order to see what kind of effect remittances may have on inequality, the distribution of 
remittances across quintiles of per capita expenditure will be viewed. Because quintiles are 
affected by the amount of remittances received, I will look at percent of remitters and fraction 
of migrants64 for quintiles of per capita consumption net of remittances. Figure 11 shows that 
the majority of migrants and remitters come from the fourth quintile. Second in the rank is the 
highest quintile, followed by the third, then second and lastly lowest quintile.  
  
Figure 11: Number of Migrants and Remitters, and % of Remitters by Quintile (per               
capita expenditure net of remittances)
          Source: WB (2007)
Clearly, relatively better off households send out more migrants and receive relatively more 
remittances. This can suggest a negative impact of remittances on inequality. However, these 
indications are by no means conclusive. In order to assess the real impact of remittances on 
for example the GINI coefficient, more qualitative research needs to be undertaken in the 
field. Looking at the relation between welfare level and the share of migrants sending 
remittances in each quintile we see that the trend is almost flat. It is also interesting to note 
                                               
64 We are speaking of split-off migrants 
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that there is no substantial difference across quintiles in the mean amount remitted by the 
split-off migrants (figure 12).
Figure 12:  Mean amount remitted by quintile
                                           Source: WB (2007)
Lastly, a word about the utilization of the remittances received by poor compared to non-poor 
households. We have seen that there are no substantial differences in the share of remittance-
sending migrants across quintiles, nor in average amount remitted; we also have seen that,
proportionally, the largest amounts are flowing into the poor Mountain regions compared to
richer parts of the country. Knowing also that the purchasing power of money is slightly 
higher in poor rural areas and that an increase in poor household income has a larger wealth-
improving effect on the margin than an equal increase in non-poor household, I can conclude 
that the effect of remittances on poverty alleviation is larger than evident from numerical 
values in official statistics. In order to calculate the precise effect, weighted indexes need to 
be used that give more weight to the utilization of remittances on basic needs than on luxury 
consumption.
6.5 Indirect effects of remittances
On the macroeconomic level, consensus holds that remittances have been crucial for the 
economic survival and poverty alleviation in Albania (De Soto et al 2002, King 2005). Maybe 
the most important macro economic impact to be mentioned is the remittances’ contribution 
to the reduction of the country’s trade deficit, through the foreign exchange they provide. An 
influx of foreign currency allows an economy to invest more than it saves, to spend more than 
it produces or to import more than it exports. Albania is a country with a poor industrial 
infrastructure and export sector, and relies heavily on imports. Labor is (unfortunately) the 
county’s main export. Consequently, remittances enable the Albanian economy to import 
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much more than it exports. As can be seen from figure 13, remittances have financed between 
50% and 75% of the trade deficit during the period 1996-2005. In recent years there has been 
a decline in the financing of trade balance by remittances.
However, since remittances are mostly spent on imported consumer goods, there is an adverse 
effect on the balance of payments, but this is hard to measure. An immediate effect following 
the financing of the trade deficit is the real appreciation of the local currency - the Lek. 
Consequently, the Dutch Disease phenomenon is felt, as the country’s exporters and local 
producers are hurt in the face of higher imports and competition. This argument is supported 
by De Zwager et al 2005 who argue that Albanian exporters are crowded out as a result of 
currency appreciation caused by remittances.
Figure 13: Remittances in relation to trade balance, 1996-2005
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Two sectors that have experienced the highest benefits from remittances are Construction and 
Tourism. In 2007 the export earnings from tourism reached a level of 1 billion euro, which is 
27 times higher than income from the export of goods.65 The major part of this money comes 
from Albanian emigrants who spend their holidays in Albania. According to BOA, economic 
growth in Albania since the late 1990s has been led by growth in the tertiary sector, and 
remittances have been the main factor contributing to the building industry (BoA, 2003).
Capital formation: Only a few studies have focused on the role of remittances in capital 
formation in Albania, and a number of them indicate that remittances have indeed contributed 
                                               
65 Bank of Albania (2007), Balance of Payments
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to capital formation in the country. The results from the survey carried out by Kule et al 2002 
show that remittances contribute about 17% to the establishment of businesses.
Table 11: Contribution of Capital Sources for the Establishment of Firms in Albania
N=190 Mean % Std. Dev
Remittances 17.20 33.59
Loan from Albanian banks 4.73 15.71
Loan from international banks 1.16 8.13
Loan from financial institutions in Albania 0.22 1.70
Loan from Family/Relatives 7.52 18.50
Loan from friends 8.75 20.31
Own capital 55.58 40.52
Other sources 4.83 17.16
         Source: Kule et al 2002
Another study carried out by Kilic et al 2007 analyzes the impact of past migration of current 
household members on business ownership. Using data from a nationally representative 
household survey (LSMS 2005), they prove that there is a strong, positive relation between 
past (return) migration and business ownership66. 
Historically, there is evidence that remittances played a role in financing a series of 
investment schemes in Albania between 1995-1997 which promised the investors 
unsustainable high returns on and finally collapsed to result in huge socio-economic unrest 
and even civil war in some parts of the country. Some argue that remittances drove the 
emergence of the pyramid schemes (Korovilas 2005), as the Albanian economy at the time 
was far too small to finance such large deposits ( between 1995 and 1996 the schemes 
attracted between 1 – 1.3 billion USD, roughly equal to half of Albania’s GDP for 199667).
However it is difficult to measure the amount of remittances injected into these schemes, as a 
large amount of foreign currency invested in them came from illegal activities, which 
certainly are not to be regarded as remittances, even though official accounts group all foreign 
currency entering the country (that does not come from exports) as remittances.
                                               
66 However, it can not be concluded that this positive relationship only comes from the contribution of 
remittances in business establishment, since human capital and skills may also be included.
67 Korovilas (2005), page 186
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6.6 Current issues regarding the impact of remittances on the Albanian economy
Today in Albania, the topic of remittances is very popular and frequently debated on national 
media. What is happening now, (mainly) as a result of the world financial crisis, is that 
remittances are decreasing substantially due to loss of jobs among emigrants and difficult 
days to come. Consequently, the local currency Lek is depreciating in value, causing an 
inflationary pressure.68 Since most goods are imports, inflation is now on the rise, and the 
group most hurt is the poor population. According to WB, a significant share of the Albanian 
population lives just above the poverty line. If the price-level keeps going up, this group of 
people will soon find themselves below the national poverty line – poverty will increase. This 
situation is a concrete example of the level of dependency on remittances in the Albanian 
economy, and the consequences following this dependency. Nikas and King (2005) foresaw 
that “a sudden decline in the size of remittances, due to a recession in the countries of 
destination for example, could devastate the Albanian economy”.69 As it appears, this 
situation is now a living one and has left its first impression. The future will show just how 
devastating it will become for the Albanian economy.
                                               
68 Note, decline in remittances is not the only cause of this. 
69 De Zwager et al. (2005), page 47
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7. Summary and Conclusions
The flow of remittances into Albania began around 1993, two years after the opening of the 
country’s borders for international migration, and has since then been growing at a rapid pace. 
Migration has come to characterize the Albanian society and remittances are viewed by many
households as the only escape from poverty. A qualitative assessment by the WB in 2001 
concluded that the main factor distinguishing a poor family from non-poor ones is
remittances.
The most common channels for remittance flows to Albania are the informal ones – a 
concerning fact given their size and potential benefits if used for intermediation. However, 
despite the financial schemes of 1996/97, the use of formal channels to remit money has 
actually increased impressively, by almost 40% between 1994-2004, which reflects peoples 
confidence in the banking system.
As for the geographic distribution, in absolute terms, the largest flows are to the coastal and 
central regions. However, proportionately speaking, more and larger amounts flow into the 
Mountain areas, which are also the poorest in the country. At the same time, these are the 
regions that experience the highest rates of poverty reduction, after the capital Tirana, and the 
only ones to experience a decline in inequality. I believe that the link is more complicated 
than simply straightforward, although remittances do play a role in the observed trends. In 
order to assess their real impact on poverty reduction and inequality on a regional basis, 
models need to be constructed to take into account other influencing factors. This paper also 
shows, by comparing migrant to non-migrant households, that remittances from permanent 
migration have contributed to higher consumption and lower absolute poverty. As for relative 
poverty, recipient families’ perceptions are that remittances have improved their financial 
situation.
Attention should be paid to the sustainability of remittances as an income source and 
especially their impact on agricultural production of the poor households. Studies indicate that 
there are indeed moral hazard problems related to remittances in Albania. They point to 
reduced labor efforts, lower farming efficiency and lower household levels of investment in 
productivity-enhancing and time-saving technologies in agriculture, as a result of remittances.
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Remittances represent 47% of household income for recipient households (13% for total 
households) and are mainly used to finance living expenses and to some extent for home 
improvements. Many view the use of remittances for basic consumption as a concern and 
argue that the government should channel this money into productive investment. But, this 
argument ignores the very nature of remittances – that they are compensatory. Instead, focus 
should be turned to attracting into Albania the formal savings of Albanian migrants abroad, 
and use these as a source of capital to finance growth. This is where the real development 
potential from migration lies.
The impact of remittances on inequality is somewhat harder to assess. Relatively better off 
households receive relatively more remittances than poor households, which can have a 
negative impact on inequality. On the other hand, the share of remitting migrants and the 
mean amount remitted do not differ much between quintiles. 
Because remittances in Albania are a relatively recent phenomenon, their long-term effects 
have not yet been assessed. Although the direct impact of remittances has so far been positive 
for recipient households, this source of income is not stable and does not constitute a 
sustainable mechanism for long-term growth and development. According to predictions the 
volume of remittances is expected to gradually diminish in the medium term, and in the case 
of Albania they are believed to have reached a stage of maturity. The current micro and macro 
situations in the country show high dependency on remittances. Consequently, this decrease is 
likely to have some negative effects, both on the individual household level, and on the macro 
level. Heavily dependent households will most likely return to poverty, and on a national level 
there will be currency depreciation and widening of the trade balance.
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